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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1939 movie, The Wizard of Oz, Dorothy, Scarecrow, Lion,
Tin-Man, and Toto all go to meet the Wizard of Oz after melting
the Wicked Witch of the West. 1 As they are impressed and

1. The Wizard of Oz, IMDB.COM,
/?ref_=nv_sr_1 (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0032138
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frightened by the loud voice and pyrotechnics going on around the
Wizard, Toto, Dorothy’s dog, proceeds to pull back a curtain
revealing the Wizard of Oz as an old man running an elaborate
machine of fire, smoke, and loud noises to intimidate Dorothy and
her friends. In this article, I hope to draw back at least some of the
curtain 2 of tort reform to see the tort system for what it really is,
and what it really is not.
A tort is “[a] civil wrong, other than breach of contract, for
which a remedy may be obtained.” 3 The term, “tort,” encompasses
a wide range of non-contract disputes outside of criminal
culpability. The tort reform debate “has been especially heated
when it comes to medical malpractice.” 4 Thus, this article will
mainly discuss tort reform issues in the context of medical
malpractice torts; however, it will also address the importance of
tort reform in other areas of the law.
The purposes of the tort compensation system inform any
discussion of tort reform. Most commentators agree that these
purposes are to: (1) compensate injured parties and (2) deter future
inappropriate behavior. 5 John Goldberg offers a more comprehensive
purpose and definition of tort law:
[T]ort is best understood as a law for the redress of private wrongs.
Taking seriously tort’s structure, vocabulary and ‘grammar’, leads
one to grasp that the point of this body of law is to articulate duties
of conduct that individuals and entities owe to one another, and to
empower those injured by breaches of these duties (i.e., by wrongs)
to invoke the law to go after their wrongdoers. Tort law, in other
words, is best theorized as a special kind of victims’ rights law. As
such, it promises to deliver various goods within our liberalconstitutional system of government apart from deterrence and
compensation, even though it will sometimes deliver those as well.
In particular, it reinforces and refines norms of responsible

2. In the tort reform context, the curtain is the belief or perception that plaintiffs’ tort
cases are a problem with the tort system, and that by systematically limiting the rights of
injured parties, the tort system will somehow fix itself. Additionally, part of the curtain assumes
that the tort system is in fact “broken” in its current state.
3. Tort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2014).
4. The tort reform debate is often heated “when discussing medical malpractice torts.”
Kathryn Zeiler, Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient Compensation Crisis?, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 675, 675 (2010).
5. Id. at 694.
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conduct, helps sustain a distinctively liberal notion of civil society,
assures citizens that government is committed to attend to their
complaints on a more or less individualized basis, and avoids
excessive reliance on top-down regulation. 6

Goldberg’s more comprehensive thoughts on the purpose of the
tort system are instructive in analyzing the arguments for and against
tort reform. In a sense, his thoughts give a type of measuring tool to
determine whether the reforms, made or proposed, will better assist
the tort system in accomplishing its goals.
This Article will address a wide variety of arguments for and
against tort reform, and will discuss possible solutions to improve the
current tort system. My purpose in writing this Article is not to offer
a definitive solution to the tort reform debate, but instead to
accurately present and analyze tort reform issues in the hope that
someday a “wise agreement” 7 will be negotiated that meets the
needs of all parties involved in the tort system.
II. A CASE FOR TORT REFORM
The following subsections are a general overview of the
arguments often made by proponents of tort reform. To start, I
provide a high-level overview of the purposes and goals of tort
reform. Next, I discuss typical tort reform arguments, including:
unreasonable litigation, harm to physicians, undeserving parties, and
tort reform success stories.
A. The Purposes and Goals of Tort Reform
In a general sense, tort reform often “refers to legislative
proposals or enactments that modify the common law rules of
torts.” 8 From a less formal point of view, tort reform often means
passing laws to deter outrageous jury verdicts and windfall recoveries

6. John C. P. Goldberg, What Are We Reforming? Tort Theory’s Place in Debates over
Malpractice Reform, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1075, 1076–77 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
7. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 4 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed.
1991) (“A wise agreement can be defined as one that meets the legitimate interests of each
side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting interests fairly, is durable, and takes community
interests into account.”).
8. Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 119,
120 n.3 (2007).
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to undeserving parties. In essence, tort reform is a political agenda
developed in response to perceived problems with the current
tort system.
B. Typical Tort Reform Arguments
Arguments made by proponents of tort reform vary significantly.
However, there are similar themes running throughout the majority
of the arguments. For instance, corporations, some of the main
proponents of tort reform, often paint themselves as victims, and
plaintiffs and their attorneys as the unreasonable aggressors.9
Christopher Roederer refers to these themes as “tort tales” and
provides four typical categorical arguments made by proponents of
tort reform: “1) elegance (they communicate moral messages that
are instantly understandable); 2) stereotypic characterization
(plaintiffs are blameworthy, defendants are not); 3) holler of the
dollar (plaintiffs are always greedy); and 4) extraordinary occurrences
symbolize
ordinary
outcomes
(as
if
they
were
normal occurrences).” 10
Roederer, apparently opposed to tort reform, portrays these
“tort tales” in a negative or somewhat cynical light. However, they
are still useful to show that the arguments and purpose of tort
reform are usually at least following similar themes. The question is
whether these themes—or assumptions—are well founded.
1. Unreasonable litigation
Perhaps the most prevalent theme of argument supporting tort
reform revolves around unreasonable lawsuits. This includes how
litigious Americans are, the recent explosion of tort litigation,
frivolous lawsuits, litigation lottery, jumbo verdicts, and astronomical
punitive damages. Each of these will be addressed below. 11

9. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 733 (1998).
10. Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The CounterRevolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 680 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
11. Each of these topics will be explained from a tort reformer point of view and then
critiqued in corresponding arguments found infra Section III.D.
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a. Litigiousness of Americans. The litigiousness of Americans is a
favorite topic of discussion for tort reformers. This argument
assumes that Americans are suing one another every chance they get.
If this were true, it would be a significant concern. Some scholars
take this argument a step—or a massive leap—further by implicating
that the true problem is that as a society, we “are diminished by
reliance on the court system.” 12 Kelner goes on to argue that “we are
culturally disempowered by the courts, as we are made less selfreliant, less willing to assume responsibility for our own actions, and
less able to cooperate for the common good. In short, we are made
weaker.” 13 Kelner’s argument, that by relying on a fatally flawed
system, we as a society become weaker, is compelling. However, his
argument, like the arguments of many tort reformers, fails to take
into the account the alternative. 14 In sum, the argument boils down
to the proposition that refraining from lawsuits is the responsible
thing to do, and those who decide to sue are doing so because they
are irresponsible.
b. Explosion of tort litigation. Tort reformers also reference the
recent explosion of tort litigation as a major reason to enact tort
reforms. The idea of an explosion of tort litigation is widespread and
widely accepted. For instance, Texas, a state at the forefront of tort
reform, is often seen as having a significant increase in tort cases in
recent decades. 15 An across-the-board increase in tort litigation, if
supported by empirical evidence, would be a significant cause for
concern and a strong foundation for tort reform.
c. Frivolous lawsuits. Hand in hand with the litigation explosion
rationale, proponents of tort reform argue that not only has there
been a significant increase in tort litigation, but these new lawsuits
arise out of frivolous matters. This argument is crucial to tort reform
because an increase in lawsuits alone would not necessitate drastic

12. Joshua D. Kelner, The Anatomy of an Image: Unpacking the Case for Tort Reform,
31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 296 (2006).
13. Id. (emphasis in original).
14. This is addressed further infra Section III.D.1.a.
15. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY
L.J. 1225, 1226 (2004).
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reforms of the tort system, 16 but the assumption that the alleged
increase in lawsuits is driven by frivolous claims, if true, would
be concerning.
d. Litigation lottery. The litigation lottery argument is fascinating
and possibly one of the most compelling arguments in the tort
reformer’s arsenal. The litigation lottery argument is twofold: 1)
those entering the lottery are doing so for personal gain as opposed
to recovering for their injuries and 2) the odds of success of any
claim is unrelated to the merits of the claim. 17 The litigation lottery is
sometimes referred to as “jackpot justice” to reflect the assumption
that the tort system issues random results for lucky plaintiffs. 18 To
further support this argument, proponents of tort reform typically
include anecdotal stories, such as the McDonald’s hot coffee suit.19
These stories also highlight the supposed issue of irrational juries
awarding unfounded non-economic damages.
e. Jumbo verdicts. Linked closely, perhaps inextricably, with the
litigation lottery argument is the jumbo verdicts argument. This
argument is simple: juries award ridiculously large verdicts that in
turn bankrupt or put physicians out of business. The jumbo verdicts
argument overlaps with the litigation lottery argument in that
sometimes a plaintiff may win the litigation lottery with a jumbo
verdict. However, it differs in the sense that the jumbo verdict
argument also applies to plaintiffs with meritorious claims in that
maybe the plaintiff did deserve some type of recovery but the
irrational juries and activist judges continually turn what should be
reasonable jury verdicts into jumbo verdicts.
f. Astronomical punitive damages. According to tort reformers,
juries often arrive at jumbo verdicts through the irrational and
unsubstantiated application of punitive damages. Again, the main
support for this argument is anecdotal stories in which special
16. Reforms would likely be necessary to accommodate the larger volume of nonfrivolous cases, but these are not the reforms suggested by proponents of tort reform.
17. Kelner, supra note 12, at 266.
18. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform:
It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1092 & n.22 (2006).
19. See generally Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. D-202 CV-9302419, 1995 WL 360309 (Bernalillo County, N.M. Dist. Ct. August 18, 1994).
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damages were of a limited amount and the jury, for allegedly no
reason, awarded significant or, as tort reformers would put it,
astronomical punitive damages.
2. Harm to physicians.
The second prong to the tort reform argument often focuses on
the alleged harms that the current tort system causes to physicians.
Physicians carry significant weight in the tort reform debate because
they are “the most respected and visible representatives” of the
healthcare industry—an industry with “inconsistent positions” on
tort reform. 20 Physicians tend to be quite vocal in support of tort
reform, often arguing that high malpractice insurance rates are due
to the tort system and that the tort system encourages such practices
as defensive medicine. 21 High insurance premiums and defensive
medicine in turn lead to geographic areas where doctors are allegedly
unwilling to practice—sometimes referred to as judicial hellholes.
Each of these three issues will be discussed below.
a. Outrageous insurance premiums. Outrageously high insurance
premiums are one of the more logical reasons to support tort reform.
However, a causal link between the current tort system and medical
malpractice premiums has yet to be established. Nevertheless, if a
link existed, this would become a powerful and legitimate reason to
support tort reform.
Florida’s largest medical liability insurer used the promise of
reductions in medical malpractice premiums as a “carrot” to
incentivize the state legislature to pass tort reform bills. 22 After
dangling the carrot, Governor Bush said that passing the proposed
legislation would help reduce the malpractice premiums in the
state. 23 However, as will be discussed later, simply passing bills does
not
guarantee,
or
even
appear
to
affect,
medical
malpractice premiums.

20. Davies, supra note 8, at 151.
21. Id. at 152.
22. Stephanie Francis Ward, New Tactic in Tort Reform Battle: Insurer Promises Lower
Rates if Legislature Caps Damages, 2 No. 23 A.B.A. J. E- REP. 4 (Jun. 13, 2003).
23. Id.
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b. Defensive medicine. Defensive medicine occurs when physicians
make treatment decisions based on potential legal liability as opposed
to strictly medical concerns. In other words, defensive medicine
prevents physicians from acting in the best interests of their
patients. 24 Proponents of tort reform argue that defensive medicine
occurs because the tort system is out of control and physicians are
sued constantly.
Defensive medicine is conceptually easy to swallow. The logic
behind it—if it is indeed supported by logical evidence—is that large
verdicts lead to higher premiums, which lead to physicians being
scared to make mistakes. Logical or not, this view was widely
adopted and even touted by President George W. Bush. 25

c. Judicial hellholes. Each of the above physician-related
arguments combine to create what some organizations have termed
judicial hellholes. 26 Judicial hellholes result when the compounding
effects of jumbo verdicts, high premiums, high healthcare costs,
decrease in insured individuals, and defensive medicine all lead to
physicians allegedly avoiding certain geographical locations. 27
3. Undeserving parties
The third prong to the tort reform argument is that the parties,
both the injured plaintiffs and their attorneys, are undeserving and
irresponsible. This argument tends to focus on anecdotal stories
about flamboyant or ridiculous trial attorneys and uneducated,
undeserving, and greedy plaintiffs, both filing lawsuits just to
make money.
a. Greedy plaintiffs. Perhaps the most common iteration of the
undeserving-plaintiff argument is that personal injury or medical
24. Kelner, supra note 12, at 297.
25. Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits; President Says ‘Junk’ Litigation is
Driving Small-town Doctors out of Business, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, at A6 (“America’s
health care professionals should be focused on fighting illnesses, not on fighting lawsuits. Junk
lawsuits change the way docs do their job. Instead of trying to heal the patients, doctors try
not to get sued.”) (quoting President George W. Bush).
26. For a list of the American Tort Reform Association’s top “judicial hellholes,” see
http://www.atra.org/newsroom/california-again-ranks-1-%E2%80%98judicialhellhole%E2%80%99.
27. Zeiler, supra note 4, at 675.
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malpractice plaintiffs are inherently greedy. They are greedy in that
“plaintiffs seek to exploit the legal system for profit, rather than, seek
redress for severe and serious injuries.” 28 Some proponents of tort
reform even go as far as to call these injured plaintiffs
“golddiggers.” 29 Kelner further paints a picture by referencing a
stereotypical view of injured plaintiffs: “The familiar image the
argument conjures is that of the man wearing a neck brace in the
courtroom for the benefit of the jury, but who no doubt will remove
it once a verdict is delivered.” 30
Kelner also notes a variation, or sub-argument, of the greedy
plaintiff contention—“resort to the court system should ordinarily
be unnecessary, even when an injury is suffered.” 31 The idea behind
this argument is that injured plaintiffs should take responsibility and
if they take responsibility, there is no need for filing lawsuits. 32 The
underlying message of these arguments is that many plaintiffs know
they do not deserve anything, but they still irresponsibly sue to
make money.
b. Passive plaintiffs. Another variation on the undeserving-plaintiff
argument is that plaintiffs are passive participants to the legal process.
Kelner refers to these plaintiffs as “passive participa[nts] in the
lawyers’ expeditions.” 33 These plaintiffs differ from the greedy
plaintiffs in that they may not fully understand what they are doing,
and in fact, they are probably doing very little. In this case, most of
the blame falls on the attorneys for “using” their clients just to make
money off their claims. Here, the attorneys make the money while
their injured clients are unaware and merely along for the ride.

c. Greedy trial lawyers. The third and final variation of the
undeserving-plaintiff argument is that trial lawyers are greedy and
motivated by money rather than helping people. Kelner succinctly
summarizes this argument, “Essentially, trial lawyers have both the
skill and resources to capitalize upon an unsuspecting public and a

28. Kelner, supra note 12, at 257.
29. Mark B. Greenlee, Kramer v. Java World: Images, Issues, and Idols in the Debate over
Tort Reform, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 701, 709 (1997).
30. Kelner, supra note 12, at 258.
31. Id. at 294.
32. Id. at 255, 294.
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permissive media in the advancement of their cause.” 34 This
argument carries significant weight because successful trial lawyers
often become wealthy and influential. Former Solicitor General
Theodore Olson noted how influential trial lawyers have become,
referring to trial lawyers as a “third political party” and contending
that trial lawyers contribute “more money to political elections than
any other segment of American society.” 35
This argument is not entirely without merit. The claim that all
trial lawyers are motivated by morally sound reasons is naïve, but it is
important to understand that this argument is furthered significantly
when tort reformers use extreme examples to prove their point. 36
4. Tort reform success stories
A final, but less commonly used argument is based on tort
reform success stories. These stories often provide anecdotal or
unsupported claims that tort reform in certain areas has increased
business growth or helped physicians. While tort reform has in some
cases lessened payouts by insurance companies, it has rarely, if ever,
been found to be directly correlated with business growth through
decreases in malpractice premiums.
C. Current Tort Reforms
The following are a few of the more common types or avenues of
tort reform. Each will be discussed briefly to provide context for the
proposed reforms at the end of this article.

33. Id. at 254.
34. Id. at 250.
35. Theodore B. Olson, Clinton’s Payoffs to the Trial Lawyers, WALL ST. J., March 15,
1996, at A10.
36. An infamous example of an over-the-top trial attorney is Willie E. Gary. Despite not
being an accurate representation of trial attorneys in general, the videos on Gary’s website
embody the arguments presented by tort reformers. Willie E. Gary Attorney Profile, THE LAW
OFFICES
OF
GARY,
WILLIAMS,
PARENTI
&
WATSON,
PLLC,
http://www.garylawgroup.com/gary/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). Another example
is Jamie Casino’s Super Bowl 2014 commercial in which he smashed fiery gravestones with a
CASINO
INJURY
ATTORNEYS,
sledgehammer
in
the
rain.
JAMIE
http://jamiecasinoinjuryattorneys.com/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
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1. Caps on damages
Damages caps are arguably one of the most pervasive and
widespread types of tort reform in the United States. These caps
place limits on a wide variety of damages including by limiting “joint
and several liability, limiting the collateral source rule, and capping
non-economic damages, including both punitive damages and pain
and suffering damages.” 37 As was noted above, these caps often come
in response to promises by insurance companies to lower
malpractice premiums.
2. Limits on attorney fees and the plaintiffs’ bar
Another common tort reform is to restrict and place limits on
the types of contingency agreements trial attorneys can enter into in
order to make it more difficult for trial attorneys to take cases. 38
Another limit placed is that of fee limitations for economic damage
and non-economic damages—similar to the damages caps. 39
3. Changing liability rules
Instead of limiting recovery in the same liability framework,
some tort reforms have actually changed the liability structure and
elements required to recover. These reforms include “making liability
less strict in products liability cases, setting up procedural obstacles in
medical malpractice cases, and providing immunity from suit for
certain industries.” 40 According to Roederer, these reforms make “it
less likely that plaintiffs and their lawyers will sue in the first place.” 41
4. Administrative regulation
Although undemocratic in nature, the administrative process is
often the vehicle for tort reform measures. For example, the George
W. Bush administration was a strong proponent of administrative

37. Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in America: The CounterRevolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 687 (2008).
38. JAY M. FEINMAN, UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK
THE COMMON LAW 27–28 (2004).
39. Id. at 29–30.
40. Roederer, supra note 10, at 686–87.
41. Id. at 687.

271

05.CHRISTENSEN.FIN05.CHRISTENSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

8/1/2016 9:02 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2016

tort reform. 42 Administrative tort reform often occurs when other
forms of tort reform are unsuccessful.
III. A CASE AGAINST TORT REFORM
The following subsections address tort reform arguments in
three ways. First, I discuss the functionality of the current tort
system, arguing that the system is not as broken as tort reform
proponents suggest. Second, I discuss the pervasiveness of tort
reform and tort reform misconceptions. Third, I respond to the
typical tort reform arguments addressed previously in this Article.
A. The Functionality of the Current Tort System
Many scholars do not believe that the current tort system
requires fixing or adjustment through tort reform. 43 In fact, many
studies have been performed that disprove the arguments made in
support of tort reform above. However, definitively stating that tort
reform is not required in any form goes too far because reliable
statistical data on the American civil litigation system is quite
limited. 44 The studies done by opponents of tort reform have proved
that many of the current tort reform measures cause more harm than
good and seem only to benefit large insurance companies. These
studies will be addressed below in more detail.
That being said, there are definite reforms that could be made to
the tort system to improve its effectiveness. Some scholars argue that
the tort system needs to be reformed because injured plaintiffs are
not compensated often or not compensated enough. 45
Opponents of tort reform also tout the flexibility of the tort
system as a significant factor in favor of leaving the tort system in its
current state. Thomas Galligan, Jr. discussed the flexibility of the tort
system in great detail in his article The Tragedy in Torts. 46 Galligan

42. Id. at 688–89.
43. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
139, 172 (1996).
44. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort
Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1149 (1992).
45. See Patricia Born, W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, The Effects of Tort Reform on
Medical Malpractice Insurers’ Ultimate Losses, 76 J. RISK & INS. 197, 198 (2009).
46. Galligan, supra note 43, at 139.
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argues that this flexibility allows the judge or jury “great freedom to
mete out ‘justice’ in the particular case before the court,” and that
this flexibility enables the tort system to be “more responsive than
other areas of private law to the specifics of the dispute.” 47 The
personal nature of the tort system coincides with the high value our
culture places on personal identity. 48 Additionally, the personal nature
of the system appeals to our innate desire for equality and for the law
to treat everyone equally. 49 The flexibility in the tort system also
allows judges and juries to take into account “compelling concerns
of the community.” 50 Galligan also notes that the types of damages
incurred by plaintiffs are inherently personal in nature and they must
be considered in a personal manner to arrive at a just decision.51
Galligan concludes that if we abandon the specificity of the current
tort system in favor of many of the generalizations proposed by tort
reform, we run the risk of losing the “compassionate response of
the community.” 52
B. Pervasiveness of Tort Reform
Despite the lack of statistical evidence to support tort reform, it
has become alarmingly widespread. For example, as of 2002, thirtytwo states have passed limits on the recovery of punitive damages,
thirty-five states have imposed joint and several liability limitations,
and thirteen have limited prejudgment interest reform. 53 Since then,
tort reform has continued to expand and has now entered into the
laws of almost every jurisdiction. 54 The pervasiveness of tort reform
is concerning for multiple reasons. First, tort reforms are often
unconstitutional because they violate the constitutional rights of
injured individuals. Second, the more pervasive tort reform becomes,
the easier it is for the public to accept it, regardless of the lack of
47. Id.
48. Id. at 141.
49. Id. at 146.
50. Id. at 160.
51. Id. at 173.
52. Id. at 183.
53. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 66 (2002).
54. See RONEN AVRAHAM, DATABASE OF STATE TORT LAW REFORMS (5th ed. 2014)
for a comprehensive explanation of the different tort reforms passed in each state.
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evidence in support of tort reform. Third, injured individuals in
every state are now harmed by tort reform.
C. Tort Reform Misconceptions
A central misconception is that tort reform was never just about
changing the actual law, but instead has “been a broad political
campaign aimed at altering the environment in which civil litigation
occurs.” 55 Advocates for tort reform have been remarkably successful
in influencing public sentiment, and thus the jury pool, about tort
reform. These changes have made it much more difficult for
plaintiffs’ lawyers to stay profitable, resulting in plaintiffs’ lawyers
finding different work and turning away injured individuals. 56 In
their research, Daniels and Martin interviewed ninety-six Texas
plaintiffs’ lawyers and found that the effects of tort reform in Texas
were much farther reaching than just malpractice torts. 57 They found
that many of the attorneys were most affected by the decrease in
value of smaller “auto cases.” 58 The plaintiffs’ lawyers believed that
the insurance companies were aware that the jury pool in Texas had
become pro-defense and partial to tort reform ideas, and thus
stopped settling smaller value cases and instead forced the plaintiffs’
attorneys either to try or not to take on low-value cases. 59 By
influencing the jury pool, tort reforms affected many more
individuals than the tort reform laws themselves touched. 60
Other scholars argue that the purpose of tort reform is not to
improve the tort system but instead is a “‘conscious goal-oriented
practical activity’ designed to produce a dominant discourse that will
predispose legislators, judges, legal academics and the general public
to support liability-limiting tort doctrines.” 61 Roederer refers to the

55. Daniels & Martin, supra note 15, at 1227.
56. Id. at 1229.
57. Id. at 1237–38.
58. Id. at 1238.
59. Id. at 1248.
60. Other scholars have found that attitudes toward tort reform often predict the
potential juror’s verdict. Gary Moran et al., Attitudes Toward Tort Reform, Scientific Jury
Selection, and Juror Bias: Verdict Inclination in Criminal and Civil Trials, 18 L. & PSYCHOL.
REV. 309, 324 (1994).
61. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 53, at 5.
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recent waves of tort reform as “‘tort deform,’ ‘tort retrenchment,’
‘corporate cost shifting’ or ‘corporate welfare.’” 62
Roederer also brings up the interesting argument that recent tort
reform is based on the concept Steven Colbert has popularized—
truthiness. Truthiness is defined as “sort of what you want to be
true, as opposed to what the facts support. . . . Truthiness is a truth
larger than the facts would comprise it—if you cared about facts,
which you don’t, if you care about truthiness.” 63 Roederer goes on
to argue the falsity of tort reform is
[B]ased in many little lies, in which cases are exaggerated, and the
amount of and the effect of frivolous lawsuits, the impact of
regulations on property rights, as well as the impact of liberal
adjudication on the sanctity of contract are all overstated. When
combined, they feed into the big lie that the common law has been
hijacked by greedy plaintiffs and lawyers, as well as by liberal
activist judges. 64

D. Responses to the Typical Tort Reform Arguments
1. Unreasonable litigation
a. Litigiousness of Americans. Contrary to the arguments made by
tort reformers, Americans are not nearly as litigious as they are
portrayed. For example, only 10% of Americans injured in an
accident make a liability claim, and only 2% file a lawsuit. 65 Likewise,
only 5% of Americans who feel that they have lost more than $1,000
file suit. 66 Another interesting comparison is the estimated number of
medical injuries compared to the number of malpractice lawsuits
filed each year. This comparison reveals that approximately 8.5% of
Americans injured by medical malpractice file suit. 67 Hyman and

62. Roederer, supra note 10, at 677.
63. Jacques Steinberg, 2005: In a Word; Truthiness, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2005, § 4, at
3 (quoting Colbert’s comments from a “recent interview”).
64. Roederer, supra note 10, at 678–79.
65. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1089 (citing THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS,
LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 3 (2002)).
66. Id.
67. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1089.
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Silver also note three other studies on the litigiousness of injured
parties, finding nearly the same results across the country. 68
b. Explosion of tort litigation. Likewise, there is little empirical
support for the alleged explosion of tort litigation. For example,
from the 1980s to the early 2000s, tort cases filed in Texas, generally
considered an active tort reform state, district courts decreased from
9.4% of civil filings to 8.6%. 69 Also in Texas, between 1995 and
2000, “the filing rate for all tort cases decreased by 31.7% . . . and
the rate for auto and non-auto cases decreased by 22.2% and 42.4%
respectively.” 70 Interestingly, in the early 2000s, family law cases
accounted for 55.1% of the civil cases filed in Texas. 71 The fact that
many Americans believe that there was or still is an explosion of tort
litigation is a prime example of what is lurking behind the curtain of
tort reform. It is an example of how popular ideologies often
overcome statistical evidence in the political realm. 72
Hyman and Silver addressed both the irony 73 of the litigation
explosion argument and present reasons why most injured patients
choose not to sue. They provide six reasons injured parties do not
file suit for malpractice claims. First, many injured patients do not
realize they are injured, or if they do realize, it is often after the
statute of limitations on their claim has expired. 74 Second, many
68. Id. at 1089–91 (Injuries in California exceeded malpractice claims filed by ten times,
in New York only 2% of injured parties filed malpractice claims, similar findings in Colorado
and Utah, in Florida malpractice injuries exceeded malpractice suits by a factor of 6.3, and just
over 10% of mothers in Florida sought legal advice when they or their child experienced
serious birth injuries or death but none filed suit.).
69. Daniels & Martin, supra note 15, at 1230.
70. Id. at 1232.
71. Id. at 1231. Daniels and Martin note that “[t]he percentage of other family matters
doubled in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. The filing rate per thousand population for
these cases increased by 109% from 1981 to 2000. In contrast, the rate per thousand
population for tort matters decreased by 17.4% between 1981 and 2000. It is somewhat
curious that the increases in family-related matters—which could fairly be called an
‘explosion’—have not led to a ‘crisis’ in the civil justice system or provoked a wide array of
proposed solutions.” Id. at 1231 n.22.
72. Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Scholarship, and Sociolegal Change: Lessons From
Galanter and the “Litigation Crisis”, 21 L. & SOCY. REV. 677, 689 (1988).
73. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1113 n.92 (“When injured patients sue, tort
reformers decry their litigiousness. When they do not sue, tort reformers point out that the
malpractice system fails to compensate them. ‘Heads, I win; tails, you lose,’ anyone?”).
74. Id. at 1113–14.
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injuries caused by malpractice are not severe enough to sue. 75 Third,
the treatment required to overcome the malpractice injuries is often
covered by the injured patient’s insurance. 76 Fourth, the costs of
making a claim through the current tort system is too high, both
monetarily and emotionally. 77 Fifth, plaintiffs making malpractice
claims often receive poor outcomes that do not cover their medical
expenses. 78 Sixth, injured parties often use cheaper and faster
alternatives than litigation to resolve their claims. 79
Despite the small amount of injured patients that actually file
suit, medical providers and insurance carriers “rarely compensate
patients until threatened with litigation.” 80 If medical providers and
insurance carriers chose to compensate injured parties for valid
claims before litigation, the nonexistent tort litigation explosion
would likely decrease even more.
c. Frivolous lawsuits. Equally unsupported is the tort reform
argument that courts are swamped with frivolous suits. Hyman and
Silver note that what little research has been done on the amount of
frivolous lawsuits filed has only revealed that no “hard evidence”
exists that frivolous lawsuits are a serious problem. 81 They also note a
study by the Federal Judicial Center that 85% of judges view
frivolous lawsuits as either “no problem,” a “very small problem,” or
a “small problem.” 82
Hyman and Silver also reference an interesting study performed
by Professor Bert Kritzer on the screening performed by plaintiffs’
attorneys. 83 Kritzer’s research found that nearly 70% of potential
personal injury claims, and over 80% of potential malpractice claims,
were declined representation because of either a lack of evidence of

75. Id. at 1114.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1114–15.
78. Id. at 1115.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1122.
81. Id. at 1101 n.45 (citing Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological
Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 163, 163 n.2 (2000)).
82. Id. at 1101 n.46 (citing DAVID RAUMA & THOMAS E. WILLGING, REPORT OF A
SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES’ EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS CONCERNING RULE
11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 3 (2005)).
83. Id. at 1102.
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liability or small damages. 84 Thus, it is hard to believe that frivolous
lawsuits are actually a serious problem if attorneys are screening the
majority of the potential claims that are brought to them.
d. Litigation lottery. Litigation outcomes in the tort system are
substantially correlated to the merits of the claims brought. Hyman
and Silver summarize multiple studies supporting the proposition
that the current tort system awards injured parties based on the
merits of their claim. 85 The summary of the research revealed that
those injured by actual malpractice were usually compensated, those
not injured usually did not receive compensation, and where the
presence of malpractice was unclear the results were varied. 86 Hyman
and Silver note that “[t]he malpractice system does not sort cases
perfectly, but perfection is an unrealistic standard.” 87

e. Jumbo verdicts. Jumbo verdicts, especially in medical
malpractice litigation, are close to nonexistent. The jumbo-verdicts
argument is not supported for two reasons. First, actual verdicts are
often not an accurate representation of the amount paid by the
losing party. Second, medical malpractice verdicts in favor of
plaintiffs are exceptionally rare.
Research shows that verdicts are often significantly more than the
amount actually paid by the losing party. Zeiler notes four reasons
for the decrease in actual recovery after a verdict is entered: “(1)
adjustments made through remittitur, (2) appellate court reversals,
(3) imposition of statutory damages caps, and (4) post-verdict
settlement negotiations.” 88 One study found that, on average,
injured parties recovered only 56% of the final verdicts. 89 This same
84. Id. (citing HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS:
CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 69–74 (2004); Herbert M.
Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 754–57
(2002); Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System,
81 JUDICATURE 22, 24 (1997); Herbert M. Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide: The Role of
Contingent Fee Lawyers, WIS. LAW., Mar. 1997, at 10, 63).
85. Id. at 1097 tbl. 2.
86. Id. at 1097.
87. Id.
88. Zeiler, supra note 4, at 688.
89. David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award? Post-Verdict
Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
3, 27 (2007).
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study found that the percentage actually recovered decreased as
verdicts increased. 90
Not only are large verdicts rarely paid in their entirety, or even
close to their entirety, but also they are seldom obtained. Hyman
and Silver note three studies on the success rate at trial in medical
malpractice cases. 91 The studies cited showed that defendants are
successful in medical malpractice trials between 73% and 81% of the
time. 92 This is a stark contrast to civil tort trials where plaintiffs
prevail 52% of the time. 93
The result of reduced verdicts and the lack of malpractice
verdicts in general is more pervasive within the tort system than is
apparent. Daniels and Martin note that participants in the tort
system “look to jury verdicts to help set the going rates used to settle
the vast majority of matters that do not go all the way to a trial.”94
The reductions in jury verdicts and the low likelihood of success at
trial for medical malpractice claims has incentivized insurance
companies to “toughen[] their stance in the settlement process that
disposes of the vast majority of cases.” 95 This in turn leads to
plaintiffs’ lawyers screening more and more cases and precluding a
larger portion of injured individuals from obtaining any type of
fair recovery.
f. Astronomical punitive damages. Along with jumbo verdicts, and
often contributing to the notion that jumbo verdicts are common, is
the idea that juries often award undeserving plaintiffs astronomical
punitive damages. However, this is rarely the case. For example,
Roederer notes studies showing that punitive damages “are only
awarded in about 6% of all the cases won by plaintiffs.” 96
Additionally, the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury will

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 6.
Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Daniels & Martin, supra note 15, at 1247–48.
Id. at 1243.
Roederer, supra note 10, at 680.
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always be subject to appellate review if the defendant believes the
punitive damages are unreasonable. 97
Finally, the idea that a plaintiff deserves, or more importantly
doesn’t deserve, punitive damages is beside the point. Punitive
damages are awarded to punish bad behavior, not to compensate the
injured. 98 The fact that punitive damages compensate injured parties
while punishing the offending party is irrelevant to whether the
punitive damages are justified.
2. Harm to physicians
a. Outrageous insurance premiums. Insurance premiums for
physicians may be high, but this is not because of the current tort
system. Professor Tom Baker wrote an entire book debunking the
myths behind tort reform and addressed insurance premiums in great
detail. 99 Baker found that increased malpractice premiums had little
or nothing to do with the alleged explosion of tort litigation and
were instead just another component of the tort reform myth. 100 For
example, Baker notes that malpractice premiums are cyclical in
nature and that “[t]he sharp spikes in malpractice premiums in the
1970s, the 1980s, and the early 2000s are the result of financial
trends and competitive behavior in the insurance industry, not
sudden changes in the litigation environment.” 101 Baker also noted
that even if malpractice premiums were exploding, they account for
less than 1 percent of total health care costs and thus are unlikely to
be precluding physicians from practicing. 102
Based on this lack of information, it is not surprising that many
people, plaintiffs’ lawyers especially, have serious doubts that passing
tort reform laws, such as damages caps, will actually decrease
malpractice premiums. 103 These doubts are rational if, in fact, the tort
system has little effect on malpractice premium rates.
97. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003)
(striking down a civil punitive damages award as excessive and in violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. Punitive Damages, Black’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
99. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 2–21 (2005).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 3.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Ward, supra note 22, at 2.
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What little research that has been done on this issue has revealed
that malpractice premiums are largely uncorrelated with the tort
system. For example, in 2003, Weiss Ratings Inc. issued a report
showing that damages caps reduced insurer payouts but did not
reduce malpractice premiums. 104 This same study indicated that “caps
may be inversely correlated to med[ical] mal[practice]
premium levels.” 105
Instead, Davies notes that “[t]here is considerable scholarship
attributing pricing of medical malpractice insurance to the cyclical
nature of the insurance industry’s underwriting cycle.” 106 For
example, Baker notes that the malpractice insurance industry is
especially susceptible to influence by the underwriting cycle. 107
Hyman and Silver use Texas as an example where premiums
increased while tort lawsuits did not, 108 referencing a study on the
trends of malpractice premiums between 1988 and 2002. 109 This
study found that the number of claims and the size of payouts were
stable over the fourteen years while the malpractice premiums
rose significantly. 110
b. Defensive medicine. The defensive medicine argument often
presented by physicians and insurance companies also lacks factual
support. Most studies on defensive medicine reveal that higher
malpractice premiums do not affect medical practices by
physicians. 111 Mello and Brennan reference studies performed by the
Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress in 1994 that
confirmed other research about the lack of facts supporting defensive

104. MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS, AND THE
AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE 7–13 (2003).
105. Id. at 13.
106. Davies, supra note 8, at 133.
107. Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL
L. REV. 393, 395 (2005).
108. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1109.
109. Id. at 1109 n.81 (citing Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical
Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988–2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207,
209 (2005)).
110. Id. at 1109.
111. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Defensive Medicine and Tort Reform: New Evidence in an
Old Bottle, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 267, 269–80 (1996).
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medicine and “surveyed several thousand physicians using clinical
scenarios to elicit their perceptions of defensive medicine . . . [and]
found some evidence that malpractice concerns spurred defensive
practices, but the effect was weaker than previously believed.” 112
Mello and Brennan also discuss other studies of defensive
medicine—all with mixed results—and offer no firm conclusion as to
whether defensive medicine ever did, or still does exist. 113 They do,
however, hypothesize that defensive medicine is now essentially
nonexistent due to “the growing presence of managed care.” 114
c. Judicial hellholes. Similarly, the proposition that judicial
hellholes are a serious problem for physicians is not only unfounded,
but is not supported by common sense. For example, as of October
2014, in the American Tort Reform Association’s annual list of
judicial hellholes, California took the number one spot for worst
judicial hellhole in the United States. 115 However, according the
2014 Census, the amount of physicians in California is
proportionally average with California registering 370 physicians per
100,000 residents, compared to the national average of 385
physicians per 100,000 residents. 116 Thus, it would appear that
doctors are not staying away from California, or other states, because
of lawsuits.

3. Undeserving parties
a. Greedy plaintiffs. The public’s perception of greedy and
undeserving plaintiffs in personal injury cases is not accurate. Davies
notes that part of this perception is because many plaintiffs are forced
into the tort system because they lack insurance, and society views
those without insurance as irresponsible and undeserving. 117 She also

112. Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606–07 (2002).
113. Id. at 1607.
114. Id.
115. Judicial
Hellholes,
AM.
TORT
REFORM
ASS’N,
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2013-2014/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
116. Aaron Young, et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the United
States, 2014, 101 J. MED. REG. 8 (2015).
117. Davies, supra note 8, at 153.
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presents the idea that this inaccurate perception “is possibly a
product of media exaggeration and misstatement of tort issues.” 118
However, the problem with the greedy plaintiff argument is
deeper than just misconception. Proponents of tort reform use the
greedy plaintiff argument to inflame the public, leading to the
adoption of laws that limit the rights of injured parties. Thinking
about alternatives to the current tort system provides the best
response to this argument. For example, would Americans prefer a
system that is allegedly full of greedy plaintiffs getting money for
injuries that did not happen, or would Americans prefer to have a
system where those who are injured—greedy or not—are unable
to recover?
b. Passive plaintiffs. The passive plaintiff argument fails for the
reasons presented in the Unreasonable Litigation section above. The
fact that so few injured parties file lawsuits and that those who seek
attorneys are rejected more than two-thirds of the time strongly
suggests that the passive plaintiff argument is unsupported
by evidence.
c. Greedy trial lawyers. The greedy-trial-lawyer argument fails for
many of the same reasons as the greedy plaintiff argument. However,
as mentioned in the corresponding section above, it is naïve to think
that trial lawyers are altruistic. Thus, I will address both whether trial
lawyers are greedy, along with the alternative argument tort reform
implicitly presents.
Most trial lawyers view themselves as “defenders of victims and
protectors of future victims.” 119 Whether or not this is true will
depend on the attorney and his or her approach to the personal
injury practice. Some attorneys are motivated solely by money, while
others are more motivated by helping others or keeping the “big
guys” from overpowering smaller individuals. The bag is surely
mixed in this regard.
The more compelling argument against greedy trial lawyers is
thinking in the alternative. Would Americans prefer to pass laws that
result in the economics of the legal profession preventing injured

118. Id. at 154.
119. Id. at 155 n.172.
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individuals from obtaining representation even more than is already
the case? Or would Americans prefer to tolerate a few greedy
attorneys in exchange for keeping the door open to injured
individuals to obtain adequate representation?
E. The Harm Caused by Damages Caps
The current tort reforms across the country cause significant
harm to injured individuals. I will briefly discuss the harms caused by
damages caps, the specific groups of individuals harmed by damages
caps, under-compensation, and difficulty obtaining representation.
1. Damages caps generally
The goal of damages caps is to reduce malpractice premiums.120
Zeiler summarizes multiple studies in her research relating to
damages caps and concludes that “tort reforms do not substantially
reduce insurance premiums . . . although the most restrictive
damages caps seem to have some impact.” 121 However, other scholars
contend that a significant problem with damages caps, among other
tort reforms, is that they are driven too much by “the political freefor-all of tort reform battles” and too little by empirical evidence. 122
Damages caps are also problematic because in many cases they
violate the constitutional rights of injured individuals. For example,
the Oregon Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court overturned
damages caps in response to constitutional challenges. 123 In response
to this constitutional problem, Professor Mark Rahdert argues that
courts would be much more willing to adopt “[c]lear damages
guidelines for juries and reviewing courts” in place of
unconstitutional damages caps. 124

120. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1087.
121. Zeiler, supra note 4, at 682–83.
122. William C. Smith, Prying Off Tort Reform Caps: States Striking Down Limits on
Liability and Damages, and Statutes of Limitation, 85 A.B.A. J. 28, 29 (1999).
123. Id. at 28 (In a nail-gun-accident case, the Oregon Supreme Court restored the
jury’s verdict to $9.3 million after the trial judge reduced the verdict per Oregon’s cap on
noneconomic damages. Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that certain tort reform
laws encroached on the judiciary’s power to interpret constitutional issues.).
124. Id. at 29.
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Another problem with damages caps is that they run against the
flexible nature of the tort system. Capping damages prevents juries
from awarding what they feel is just compensation to injured
individuals. This approach assumes that no one suffers beyond a
certain amount, regardless of the injuries or way in which the injuries
are inflicted. This is like saying that the pain and suffering for an
individual who dies instantly in a head-on collision and the pain and
suffering for an individual who was burned to death in a chemical
fire both cap out at a certain amount. Not only is this argument
illogical, it decreases the right to recovery of injured people—people
we should be reluctant to harm further.
A final argument against damages caps is that they significantly
increase the “problem of under-compensation by limiting the
remedies available to patients with serious injuries and by reducing
the number of valid claims that are sufficiently profitable for
attorneys to pursue.” 125 For example, an injured party approaches an
attorney with catastrophic injuries totaling over $5 million. The
attorney looks at the case and assesses it will cost roughly $400,000
to litigate through trial. The attorney then realizes that damages for
those particular injuries are capped at $500,000. In other words,
even if the attorney successfully tried the case and obtained a jury
verdict of $5 million, the eventual award would be reduced to
$500,000, leave the attorney with maximum fees of $200,000, or
40% of the gross recovery. 126 Spending $400,000 to try the case, and
only recovering $200,000 will prevent any attorney from signing the
client, no matter how catastrophic the injuries are.
2. Specific parties harmed
Tort reforms, and damages caps specifically, harm certain
population groups significantly more than others. For example,
empirical research on Texas tort claims suggests that “deceased,
unemployed, and . . . elderly plaintiffs endure[ed] much larger
reductions in recoveries than other plaintiffs.” 127 DeVito and Jurs

125. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1087.
126. Attorneys are also permitted to recover their costs in addition to the contingent fee.
However, this is a moot point in this scenario because the attorney would only make $100,000
with the injured party netting nothing.
127. Zeiler, supra note 4, at 686.
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note other studies with similar findings that female and elderly
plaintiffs recovered significantly less than other injured plaintiffs. 128
While it is somewhat unclear why these parties are affected more
than others, it is clear that the effect exists and is seriously
diminishing these groups’ ability to recover for injuries sustained.
3. Under-compensation
Under-compensation occurs when “[d]amages caps act to . . .
reduc[e] the compensatory damages available for a valid claim.” 129 In
addition to constitutional problems, under-compensation affects the
most seriously injured plaintiffs the most. 130 Damages caps reduce
the recovery of “the most gravely injured, even after their claims
have been proven.” 131 By precluding seriously injured plaintiffs from
recovering, damages caps “undermine[] a core principle of our legal
system, that of equal justice under the law.” 132
4. Difficulty obtaining representation
In addition to under-compensation, damages caps make it
difficult for many injured individuals to find representation—
especially those with serious injuries whose compensation will be
limited by damages caps. 133 Obtaining representation is the crucial
first step of the tort system. Without representation, an injured party
essentially does not have a claim. 134 However, because of damages
caps, attorneys are forced to screen the majority of cases that come
to them for multiple reasons.
First, plaintiffs’ attorneys are often paid on a contingency basis
and “medical malpractice cases are risky and expensive to litigate.”135
This in turn results in attorneys turning away injured individuals with
cases with low damage amounts. Additionally, the risk of taking a

128. Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs, “Doubling-Down” for Defendants: The Pernicious
Effects of Tort Reform, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 543, 594–95 (2014).
129. Id. at 593.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 595.
133. Zeiler, supra note 4, at 686.
134. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1117.
135. Id.
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malpractice case is significant because of the high win rate
malpractice defendants enjoy at trial. This high win rate also makes
defendants much less willing to settle before trial. Thus, “plaintiffs’
attorneys’ preference for cases with clear liability and large damages
is understandable. Only these cases are likely to generate fees
sufficient to cover upfront costs and provide an adequate return on
invested time and effort.” 136 Thus, damages caps are preventing
injured individuals from securing representation—without which
they could not be compensated for their injuries.
IV. DISCUSSION
Because tort reform is so pervasive and wide-reaching in effect,
the discussion must encompass more than just tort reform to grapple
fully with the problem. The issues discussed in this section are not
discussed to present definitive answers to how to improve the tort
system, but instead are referenced to broaden the perspective of the
tort system in general and to consider often unmentioned concerns
with the current tort system.
A. Tort Reform and the American Healthcare System
In an interesting article, Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda,
Julie Davies discusses tort reform in conjunction with problems
faced by the current healthcare system. 137 Davies likens her discussion
to a game of cards where some shuffling is required; shuffling the
issues commonly discussed with tort reform may open the door to
creative ideas to address both tort reform and healthcare issues
together. 138 She points out that the current debate on tort reform is
“too narrow” and relies on political justifications that reflect only
benefits to small groups and “not necessarily [what is] good from a
policy standpoint.” 139
Davies highlights the need for a universal healthcare solution
because many plaintiffs in the tort system are forced into the tort
system because they cannot afford insurance. 140 While Davies
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1120.
Davies, supra note 8, at 119.
Id.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 121–22.
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recognizes that massive change may be difficult, her generalized
solution of universal healthcare of some type or another should
become a mainstream consideration and discussion topic in all
debates on tort reform. Her article also highlights the need for tort
reform to be discussed in conjunction with future
healthcare reforms.
B. Constitutional Issues
The constitutional issues with tort reform are quite significant
and have been discussed previously to some degree. Goldberg
presents an interesting view of the problem by referring to tort as
“victims’ rights law.” 141 Goldberg’s view of tort law is instructive and
illuminates the issue at the core—that injured plaintiffs are not all
alike. They are unique individuals who have each suffered unique
harm. To lump them all together denies these plaintiffs their
individual right to the pursuit of happiness as it fits them individually.
Tort reform in essence is an attack on individuality to increase the
profits of large insurance companies. The increased profits for these
corporations should not come at the cost of the violation of the
constitutional rights 142 of injured individuals. 143
C. Political Irony
On the two sides of the tort reform debate are plaintiffs’
attorneys, generally viewed as Democrats, on one side and
Republican officials, think tanks, and large corporations on the
other. 144 While on one hand, it makes sense that plaintiffs’ attorneys
generally align with more liberal views, the paradox 145 is the

141. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1080.
142. Tort reforms may also significantly violate the constitutional right to a civil jury trial.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
143. Some state courts have begun to find state damages caps unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Barbara A. Geisman, Reform or Reshuffle? Consequences of the 2005 Missouri Tort Reform Act,
42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 155, 155–56 (2013).
144. See Baker supra, note 100, at 11 (“With some exceptions, Republican legislators
favor cutting back on tort liability and Democratic legislators do not.”).
145. The paradox is not why Republicans support tort reform—the answer is they want
to keep more of their money. The paradox, or surprise, is how quickly Republicans will
abandon the ideals of taking responsibility and a free market in exchange for a regulated
market that incentivizes large corporations to not take responsibility.
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conservative support of tort reform. Goldberg notes the irony with
conservatives in support of tort reform in that “conservatives who
wield the idea of ‘personal responsibility’ like a bludgeon, yet miss
no opportunity to trash the one body of law that, more than any
other, is all about holding persons (natural and artificial) responsible
to others.” 146 The irony is that the tort system embodies qualities
that both Democrats and Republicans should appreciate. Democrats
should appreciate that the tort system holds large corporations in
check while protecting the individual. Republicans should appreciate
that the tort system fosters responsibility, and if left unreformed,
creates a capitalist market where companies need not be regulated by
the government.
D. David vs. Goliath
The David vs. Goliath issue is not often discussed in great depth
but is one of the perpetuating causes of the tort reform debate. The
Goliath side is made up of what Roederer refers to as “a systematic
and coordinated campaign by an army of corporations, foundations,
lobbyists, litigation centers, think tanks[,] politicians[,] and
academics, to unmake or undo developments over the last 100 years
across the common law.” 147 These large “Goliaths” on the tort
reform side have the means and motivation to promote the tort
reform agenda and do so because they receive an economic return
on their investment because tort reforms will decrease their liability
to injured individuals. 148
On the David side are the plaintiffs’ attorneys. While many of
these attorneys are financially successful, none approach the massive
resources of the insurance industry. 149 Some plaintiffs’ attorneys have
146. Goldberg, supra note 6, at 1081 n.18.
147. Roederer, supra note 10, at 677–78 (internal quotations omitted).
148. See id. at 679. Corporate and insurance interests potentially hold significant
lobbying power. For example, in Florida a local insurance company promised to reduce its
premium rates in exchange for the passage of a tort reform bill. Ward, supra note 19, at 4.
149. Compare Arnold & Itkin LLP—one of the most successful trial law firms in the country,
recovering slightly over $1 billion in 5 years, Our Victories, ARNOLD & ITKIN LLP (2015),
http://www.arnolditkin.com/Our-Victories.aspx—with Allstate’s $2.7 billion in net income and
$35.2 billion in revenue for 2014. The Allstate Corporation Notice of 2015 Annual Meeting, Proxy
Statement and 2014 Annual Report, ALLSTATE CORPORATION 4 (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://www.allstate.com/resources/Allstate/attachments/annual-report/allstate-2015-ammaterials.pdf.
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built their net worth to tens of millions, some even to hundreds of
millions, but all of the large insurance companies routinely profit in
the billions each year. To skew the playing field further, the insurance
industry often unites in support of tort reform while plaintiffs’
attorneys remain disjointed. In this sense, it is almost as if one David
is fighting an army of Goliaths.
The uneven playing field also allows corporate interests to
influence the public by dumping vast amounts of resources into the
mass media to portray their version of the tort system. In response,
plaintiffs’ attorneys can only fight back in court, where they are beset
with the task of convincing jurors who view the messages sent by the
large corporations.
Critics might respond by saying that nothing is stopping the
plaintiffs’ attorneys from using mass media to plead their case—and
some surely do. However, the larger problem is that even if all the
plaintiffs’ lawyers spent all of their combined net worth to fight tort
reform, it would not amount to even a year’s worth of profit in the
insurance industry. The uneven playing field prevents a rational
approach to tort reform and continues to shrink the constitutional
rights of injured individuals.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Thus far, I have addressed the many myths of tort reform as well
as some obstacles for improvement of the tort system. Now I will
share some proposed solutions. These solutions are not meant to be
comprehensive, but instead are meant to enrich the discussion of tort
reform and hopefully broaden the perspective of those in the debate.
A. Specialized Short Trial Tort Courts
Multiple states have recently adopted short trial courts where
matters can be heard and decided on an expedited and cost-effective
timetable. My proposal is to use a variation on the general short trial
programs to create a short trial system in each state specifically for
torts. These courts could expeditiously hear the cases of injured
individuals and thus decrease the costs that must be fronted by
plaintiffs’ attorneys. These courts could also eliminate some of the
delaying tactics used by repeat defendants in the tort system.
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B. Adverse Fee Incentives
Adverse fee incentives, such as Nevada’s offer of judgment rule,
would also guard against frivolous suits and encourage settlement. In
Nevada, offers of judgment are governed by Rule 68 of the Nevada
Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads in relevant part:
(f) Penalties for Rejection of Offer. If the offeree rejects an offer
and fails to obtain a more favorable judgment,
(1) the offeree cannot recover any costs or attorney’s fees and shall
not recover interest for the period after the service of the offer and
before the judgment; and
(2) the offeree shall pay the offeror’s post-offer costs, applicable
interest on the judgment from the time of the offer to the time of
entry of the judgment and reasonable attorney’s fees, if any be
allowed, actually incurred by the offeror from the time of the offer.
If the offeror’s attorney is collecting a contingent fee, the amount
of any attorney’s fees awarded to the party for whom the offer is
made must be deducted from that contingent fee. 150

In Nevada, this rule serves as an effective safeguard to frivolous
suits. If defendants feel that they have been sued frivolously, they
simply need to extend an offer of judgment in a low amount and
then prevail at trial. If they do so, they will be compensated for all of
the attorney fees they incurred after the judgment. Likewise, if
injured plaintiffs feel that the defendant is not compensating them
for a valid claim, the plaintiff can serve an offer of judgment and
then beat it at trial, substantially increasing the net recovery. This
rule also encourages settlement on both sides by making the
consequences of frivolously proceeding to trial more severe.
Critics may point out that this rule will only deter those able to
pay the attorneys’ fees at the end of the day—in other words,
bankrupt plaintiffs will not care if they face a $250,000 attorneys’ fee
judgment after a frivolous suit. This concern is valid in that some
plaintiffs may not be incentivized to proceed reasonably. However,
the proportion of bankrupt and completely financially despondent
plaintiffs is significantly low based on the pool of plaintiffs in general.
Additionally, the incentive to settle will affect the insurance

150. NEV. R. CIV. P. 68.
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companies the most, which in turn will lead to fewer tort cases
actually proceeding to trial.
C. Intelligent Damages Caps
Hyman and Silver present an interesting solution to damages
caps. Their idea is to apply damages caps based on behavior of the
parties as opposed to the current static damages caps. 151 Hyman and
Silver’s frustration with the current damages caps is that they provide
no incentives to medical providers to “improve the quality of the
services they provide.” 152 Their proposed solution is as follows:
One obvious approach is to reward providers for error reporting
and punish them for hiding mistakes. For example, when a provider
reports an error within a specified time of its occurrence, she would
receive the protection of a limit on non-economic damages. When
a provider fails to report an error in a timely manner, we propose
that non-economic damages be enhanced. One could use a similar
strategy to reward providers who improve their performance on
certain defined quality benchmarks, by allowing them to take
advantage of a second (and lower) cap on noneconomic damages. 153

Hyman and Silver’s proposition is rational and would be
beneficial both to physicians and injured patients alike.
Unfortunately, their proposal will run into the David vs. Goliath
problem. As explained above, because of the vast resources of the
tort reformers, rational proposals will likely be quashed in favor of
self-serving and unfounded reforms.
D. The Invisible Hand
Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand metaphor describes a selfregulating marketplace where individuals can maximize their
productivity without government interference. 154 An unregulated
tort system is the invisible hand in action. When plaintiffs are harmed

151.
152.
153.
154.

Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1131–32.
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1131–32.
ARTHUR SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES IN
ACTION 32 (2003).
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severely, they should be compensated significantly. This correlated
compensation will in turn incentivize those causing the harm to
correct their behavior. Over time, the tort system will balance the
market by deterring harmful behavior of defendants and fairly
compensating plaintiffs.
Hyman and Silver also discuss this principle in the context of
allowing malpractice premiums to rise:
Providers are rational. When injuring patients becomes more
expensive than not injuring them, providers will stop injuring
patients. Stated more delicately, when insurance rates go up, they
create a highly salient incentive for providers to improve the quality
of the services they are offering. Lowering malpractice premiums
through tort reform eliminates this incentive without putting
anything in its place. Litigation rates and premiums will fall on
their own when providers improve the quality of care—thus
decreasing the pool of potential plaintiffs. 155

Again, this idea may be too rational to survive the David vs.
Goliath hurdle. On top of that, it would likely be the most heatedly
opposed proposition because it would cut into the profits
companies
and
physicians—
of repeat offenders—insurance
most substantially.
VII. CONCLUSION
In order to improve the current tort system, significant research
must be performed. Further research is required in two main areas:
(1) to determine whether tort reforms are successful or not, and (2)
how verdicts are related to insurer payouts and premiums. 156 Along
with these two areas, comprehensive and uniform information about
the number of medical malpractice injuries compared to the amount
of medical malpractice suits filed each year nationwide would be
helpful. Finally, a study on the vast majority of civil tort cases that
settle would also be instructive because such a small portion of
potential tort cases are filed, let alone proceed to trial.
Creating an intelligent solution to improve the current tort
system is an uphill battle. The wealthy insurance industry will do

155. Hyman & Silver, supra note 18, at 1131.
156. Zeiler, supra note 4, at 686.
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anything it can to continue to promote the tort-reform agenda,
regardless of the lack of proof supporting their propositions. Trial
lawyers will likely not unite to fight tort reform—and even if they
did, their combined resources pale in comparison to the wealth of
the tort reformers. However, tort reform should nevertheless be
debated to inform citizens of its constitutional problems and
hopefully pull back at least a corner of the elaborate curtain hiding
the truth behind tort reform.
Roland Christensen
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